Book Review:
“Maritime Crime and Policing”
Edited by Yarin Eski and Martin Wright

Reviewed by Prof
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This elegant, well written and definitive book is edited by two leading experts in this under-researched but burgeoning field. It rightly belongs in the Frontiers of Criminal Justice series. Dr Yarin Eski is Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the Vrije University, Amsterdam. His expertise ranges across the field including the sociocultural aspects of policing, arms trade, and drug trafficking. Dr Martin Wright was a serving police officer for 30 years. In 1999 he was the only police officer ever granted a doctoral scholarship by the Association of British Insurers. While serving he was a member of the UK National Crime Strategy Group. After leaving the police he joined the University of Wolverhampton in 2008, where he led the BSc in policing. He is now a Visiting Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and security at the University of South Wales and holds a number of other positions including Managing Editor of the Oxford Journal of Policing.

In their Introduction, ‘Bringing together maritime crime and policing scholars and professionals’, Dr Eski and Dr Wright echo the mission of this Journal. To combine the academic and theoretical with the professional and empirical. Their book embraces (p. 3), the interacting panopticon of ‘crimes’, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, cargo theft, cybercrime, drug smuggling, human trafficking illegal immigration, environmental crime, arms trafficking, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, maritime terrorism and a huge problem in such a high-value and regulated industry – fraud.

The Editor’s note the anomaly that while the seas and oceans cover 70 percent of our planet and 80 percent of trade by volume is carried by sea. The UK, being an island, receives 95 percent of its trade by volume through seaports. And then there is the huge value of maritime cargoes, their insurance, and lawyers fees. However, maritime crime and policing have received little attention. The study of criminology – what makes people commit crimes – and crime science – how crimes are solved – have remained largely land-locked. This contrasts with the inter-related field of maritime security, which has received growing attention but has mainly been focused on the operations of navies and coastguards.

The editors wryly note (p. 3) that the origins of modern policing principles are in fact maritime. The idea that a force should be responsible for both the prevention and detection of crime, enshrined in Sir Robert Peel’s Metropolitan Police from 1829, originated with the Thames River Police in 1798. That force was set up to counter widespread pilfering and crime in the London docks where immensely valuable cargoes from the East Indies were unloaded. Renamed the Marine Police, the force was merged into the Met in 1839.

Following the Introduction, the book is, with consummate logic, divided into two parts. Part 1 covers maritime crime and Part 2 maritime policing – first, the problems, and second, potential solutions.
Part 1 starts with chapter 1 by Lydelle Joubert, who has served in the South African Armed Forces and still serves as a volunteer with the South African National Sea Rescue Institute (NSRI), so equivalent to the UK RNLI. Lydelle is also well known for her work with Safer Seas (successor to Oceans Beyond Piracy). She therefore echoes, again, the remit of the book and of this journal as being both an academic and a very real practitioner. Her chapter is called ‘Seas of Thieves: Who Are the Pirates and What Drive Them?’ (pp. 11 – 30). Naturally, the author has to begin with the somewhat limited 1982 UNCLOS definition, Article 101 which limits ‘piracy’ to acts of depredation committed on the high seas. Any such act committed within the twelve nautical mile limit of the Territorial Sea (and that may be disputed) is ‘armed robbery at sea’ or ‘armed robbery against ships’, which causes jurisdictional problems. These issues are dealt with extensively in the article ‘Maritime security – Lost in translation’ in this issue. That problem is especially acute in the Gulf of Guinea where many crimes are committed within that limit and are thus, technically, domestic crimes, and therefore the responsibility of littoral states, and not, technically, ‘piracy’.

The Chapter also includes three excellent diagrams (Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, pp. 12-13), showing the shift in geographical focus from 2011 – 2020. She concludes Figure 1.4 (p. 20) shows attack scenarios and 1.5 (p. 22) shows the Somali pirate network, of which there were about six by 2008, from the ‘Kingpin’ down to the boarding teams and the cook.

Joubert concludes, obviously correctly, that piracy and other maritime crimes arise from problems on land. IUU fishing is an interrelated problem (Somali piracy originated, in part, as a counter to IUU fishing).

Chapter 2, by Anna Sergi (pp. 31 – 47) is called ‘Through the sea, via the port and into the city’ and deals, inter alia, with illicit trafficking on the waterfront. She holds a PhD in sociology from the University of Essex where she is now a professor and has authored five books. The present book as a whole focusses heavily on port issues, which are immensely complex. Prof Sergi’s chapter therefore complements and interlocks closely with Chapters 11 and 15 in part 2 which deal more with policing. Ports and the adjacent cities and hinterland are, in this reviewer’s view, the ‘glue’ that binds sea to land. As DIY enthusiasts know, glue involves two bonds, One bond between the glue and one surface, and one between the other side of the glue and the other surface. Ports are just like glue. There is, as Prof Sergi observes (p. 31), a port-sea interface and a port-city (and hinterland) interface. On p. 42 in Figure 2.1 she illustrates the parallels between the Port – Sea interface and the Port-City Interface. On p. 32 Prof Sergi notes that one of the biggest revolutions has been containerisation, which has offered huge opportunities to increase port capacity but corresponding challenges. She then notes the potential of ‘dry ports’ to improve efficiency and enhance the capacity of seaports. A dry port, as Prof Sergi observes, citing three recent sources (2007, 2009, 2021), is

*An inland intermodal terminal directly connected to seaport(s) with high-capacity transport mean(s). where customers can leave / pick up their standardised units as if directly in a seaport.*

Dry ports offer deposits, maintenance of containers, internal intermodal transports for cargo, trucks, freight trains and ships. (p. 32)

An obvious example of this is DP World’s ‘port-centric logistics park’ at London Gateway since it and Tilbury became the Thames freeport in March 2021. The million square meter site 28 miles from central London continues to attract major investment.

Prof Sergi then focusses on two recent crises – Brexit and Covid – and examines the impact of each under the two headings of Port-Sea and Port-City interfaces, using the headings of ‘spotlights’. This is a superb methodology. During the Covid pandemic lockdowns, for example, large amounts of cocaine trafficked illicitly in containers, were held up in warehouses. The dealers seem to have regarded these stocks as reserves to be drawn on when restrictions abated, and instead switched to using luxury yachts and non-cargo ports to bring supplies in (p. 39). The author concludes that ports are crucial hubs for maritime crime and for countering it.
Chapter 3, ‘Illegal maritime migration on the Western Mediterranean route: a great challenge for Europe’, is by Dr Marta Fernández Sebastián, a member of the expert group at the PsyD Observatory of the Peace, Security and Defence Chair at the University of Zaragoza. She defines (pp. 50-51) the four main routes – the central Mediterranean, the most used, which is also explored in a paper in the present issue of IJMCS (see above); the eastern Mediterranean from Turkey through Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria, the western from north Africa, mainly Morocco and Algeria, to Spain, not only by sea across the Strait of Gibraltar, but also overland to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and the west African via the Canary Islands.

As a Spaniard, the author naturally focusses on the western Mediterranean and western Africa routes, which, she demonstrates, have experienced significant growth since 2017 (pp. 52-53 and Table 3.1). Until 2020 the majority of migrants intercepted trying to reach Spain were Moroccans followed by Algerians and sub-Saharan nationals. After that Algerians became the largest group.

After detailing the modus operandi of the two western smuggling routes, the author focusses on cooperation between Morocco and Spain, starting with the first migration agreement between the two countries in 1992. She then examines the important role of EU cooperation, starting with EC Council Regulation No. 2007 of 2004. Following the Refugee Crisis of 2015, in 2016 the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex 2021 replaced the earlier organisation set up in 2004. In 2020, for example, Frontex sent 26 agents to the Canary Islands and at the time of writing had 257 officers assisting Spain in the fight against illegal migration across the Strait of Gibraltar and the Alboran Sea (the narrow part of the Mediterranean inside the Strait).

In her conclusion the author notes the importance of partnership between the EU and neighbouring countries like Turkey, which has special responsibility for the eastern and central Mediterranean routes. She suggests having a similar partnership with Morocco and maybe extending such agreements further, to Algeria, Mauritania, or Senegal. In the end, however, the problem of migration lies not with border or maritime security but in migrants’ countries of origin. The ultimate solution lies in removing the perceived need for people to move by resolving the conflicts, crime, and poverty in their countries (p. 59).

Chapter 4 is by Prof Osato Anastasia Eruaga of the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and Dr Irekpian Okukpan whose PhD is from Cape Town and is now at the University of Bradford, UK. It addresses the ‘Transnational Nature of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated [IUU] Fishing: Examining Global Strategies, Punishment and Solutions’ (pp.63-82). It is hard to overestimate the importance of the IUU Fishing issue. In 2021, the world consumed more fish protein (160 million metric tonnes) than the next category, poultry. (133 million tonnes) (https://www.statista.com/statistics/1025784/human-consumption-of-protein-by-type-worldwide/). The authors begin by noting that the 2020 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) set out in 2015, and emphasize the need for fisheries development; Specifically, Goal 14.4 which requires states to effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, and destructive fishing practices by 2020’ (p. 63). Additionally, Goal 14 4 requires states to restore fish stocks to a maximum sustainable yield level through the implementation of science-based management plans in the shortest time feasible. Needless to say, these ambitious goals have not been achieved.

IUU fishing has widespread, varying, and unexpected implications. This reviewer recalls that Three ‘Cod Wars’ occurred between the UK (supported by West Germany and Belgium) and Iceland in 1958-61, 1972-73 and 1975-76. The latter ended with Iceland and UK agreeing to limit their fishing to within 200 nautical miles of their shores, which was the basis of the 1982 UNCLOS ruling that nations were entitled to up to a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), depending on geography. Fishing by large ships from
foreign countries was cited as one of the reasons for Somali-based pirates starting to attack foreign shipping in the early 2000s. While no excuse, it may have been a partial explanation.

The concept of IUU fishing was first mentioned in the context of the Antarctic in 1997. It was first defined by the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in its International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing (IPOA IUU) in 2001. The term does not just refer to the physical act of stealing large quantities of a country’s fish, but also forging vessels’ documentation, including ownership documents, multi-flagging, and illegally altering vessel names to confound and complicate countermeasures. This includes illegal transhipment of fishing from big vessels operating in other countries’ EEZs (Distant Water Fleets - DWFs) to smaller vessels able to get the illegal catch to market. This leads on to the next section ‘Juxtaposing IUU Fishing and Transnational Organised Crime (TOC)’. Large fishing vessels are more likely to have connexions to TOC, artisanal fisher folk less so.

The Chapter then examines the legal framework for addressing IUU fishing, which originates in UNCLOS (1982), the FAO Compliance Agreement, the United Nations Fish Stocks agreement (UNFSA). Two detailed case studies follow on State regulation of IUU fishing, by Indonesia and South Africa. Indonesia had suffered severely from IUU Fishing with an estimated ten to 23 million US dollars’ worth of fish being illegally fished in 2014. Indonesia adopted a ‘zero tolerance’ approach, treating IUU fishing as a criminal matter and not merely a fisheries management problem, one case study which tells the whole story is that of the *Viking* captured by the Indonesian Navy in February 2016. The authors continue:

‘The *Viking* was owned by companies registered in two countries with crew consisting of five persons from Argentina, Peru and Myanmar and six from Indonesia, the ship was operated by agents in Southeast Asia to catch fish on African coasts and export caught fish through transhipment and ship to Hong Kong, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan through investment companies in South Africa. It was also discovered that the ship had been operating under 13 and at least state flags to avoid arrest by officers in international waters.’ (p.73)

There could be few better examples of the complex issues involved in IUU fishing and its interaction with TOC. The ship had also entered Indonesian waters without prior notice and switched off its Automated Identification System (AIS). Gigantic fishing nets which breached Indonesian regulations were found on board. The Indonesian Government’s response was robust. They sank it off West Java. Although UNCLOS does not support Indonesia’s sink and burn policy, it was a striking example of what the criminalisation of IUU fishing can mean.

The authors cite another example, the *Benjina*, underlining the interlocking of IUU fishing and other TOC. Although a fishing vessel, *Benjina* had been involved in human trafficking and the Indonesian court fined the fishing company $62,000 as restitution to the victims.

IUU fishing is a major threat to food security in Africa. South Africa has used the traditional fisheries management approach, and not yet framed IUU fishing as a TOC offence. Pressure to do so has grown because valuable marine life including rock lobster and abalone - a term for a range of shellfish molluscs which are regarded as a delicacy in some parts - has been illegally harvested and exported. A number of organised crime networks engaged in abalone trafficking have been prosecuted under South Africa’s 1998 Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA).

The authors conclude by analysing the pros and cons of criminalising IUU fishing. Most developed countries still regard it as a fisheries management problem but treating it as crime would simplify and facilitate the international cooperation which would inhibit it. One of the big problems is that most countries lack the naval, coastguard and marine police assets to enforce deterrence and investigation. They say that more states need to sign up to the FAO’s Agreement on Port-State measures to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate IUU Fishing. That would deny IUU fishers places to hide or further places to tranship their catches.

Chapter 5, ‘Maritime Crime in the western Indian Ocean: Interlinkages and Dynamics’ is by Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Linnea Kjølstad Larsen, both at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen. The essence of this profound, insightful, and very well-written chapter is a simple truth: that Transnational Organised Criminals are adaptable and that, as with a partially inflated balloon, if you push down on one type of crime, for example, piracy, the air in the balloon moves somewhere else. This phenomenon is known as ‘crime switch displacement’ (p. 83). Focussing on Somalia, the chapter first examines the way former Somali pirate kingpins, their foot soldiers chased off the seas, have turned to other forms of TOC such as weapons smuggling, people trafficking, kidnapping and switched effort from profit to supporting the Somali-based Islamist terrorist group al-Shabaab. The chapter suggests that rather than segregating piracy as a discrete problem, our approach should be to re-conceptualise the problem as one of ‘poly-criminals’ (p. 84).

The ensuing sections examine former pirates and onshore kidnappings, including international humanitarian aid workers and staff, migrant smuggling, weapons smuggling and delivering to al-Shabaab. The third section of the chapter (pp. 88-91) examines pirates as poly-criminals, a phrase apparently coined by Europol in 2017. The rest of the chapter further examines the ballooning effect and warns against defining piracy and its origins too narrowly. Although the chapter uses the example of Somali pirates, the authors suggest that the Niger delta would be a useful comparator, with deep sea piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, onshore crime, including fuel theft, the theft of oil and riverine crime.

Chapter 6, ‘Hybrid Policing of Maritime Crime Threats? Combatting Terrorism, Piracy and Transnational Crimes at the Littoral Sea’, is by Arabinda Acharya, now Director of the Centre for Peace and Development Studies, India. He begins with a useful diagram adapted from Geoffrey Till’s work of in 2004 (Figure 6.1, p. 100), portraying Good Order at Sea, encapsulating the sea as a resource, a means of transportation and as an environment, and then highlighting the threats from asymmetric conflicts, terrorism, piracy, organised crime – although the authors of the preceding chapter would suggest the last two were part of a poly-criminal balloon = and non-state actors. Table 6.1 (pp. 109-111) is a comprehensive treatment of maritime terrorist threats and the organisations involved although, it must be said, up to the time of this review, the maritime terrorist threat has been relatively subdued. In part 6 (pp. 113-115) the author examines ‘A Hybrid model’ for policing maritime crime’, which mirrors earlier and later chapters in the book, and, in particular, Chapter 4 above.

The term ‘Littoral’ refers to ‘the area from the open sea to the shore and the area inland...’, according to the 2010 US Marine definition (p. 114). The author cites the same source to continue that.

‘While representing a relatively small portion of the world’s surface, littorals provide homes to over three quarters of the world’s population, locations for over 80 percent of the world’s capital cities, and nearly all of the marketplaces for international trade’ (p. 114).

The author then cites Maj Gen Mike Myatt, former Director of Expeditionary Warfare US Marine Corps (2010), describing ‘chaos in the littorals. Chaos in the littorals involves contestation for space and authority on land, at sea and in the sky. The author continues:

‘Layered over nationalism and sovereignty issues, and tempered by sectarian racial or religious divisions, or poverty and inequality, these contestations significantly undermine the ability of the concerned governments to respond to and maintain order on land or at sea... operations at sea have a strong umbilical cord with the Facilities on land or events ashore. Most asymmetric threats at sea are based on the littorals.’

Chapter 7. ‘From excessive to illegal land reclamation. A case study in China’ is by Edward Sing Yue Chan of the Australian National University. China has eleven maritime provinces with a total coastline of
14,500 km (7,830 nm) from the Bohai Sea (north-west of the Yellow Sea) in the north to the Gulf of Tonkin in the south (p. 121). Between 1950 and 2008 these provinces reclaimed a total of 13,380 km² of land. China’s long experience of land reclamation has made it a case study in the field. Between 2002 and 2010 China’s State of Oceanic Administration (SOA) only approved 884 km² of land reclamation whilst the actual reclaimed land was 2,400 km². After the creation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, most reclaimsations were unregulated. The first instrument for regulation was the Marine Environment Protection Law (MEPL) of 1982. This was followed by the Administration and Prevention and Control of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Coastal Construction Projects ((RAPCCPD) of 1990 (p. 123). These Laws both focussed primarily on environmental and pollution damage and did not deal with excessive or illegal land reclamation. This came in with the 2001 Law on the Administration of the Use of Sea Areas (LAUSA).

The main problems were that developers – usually state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – either started work before getting approval, reclaimed more land than had been authorised, did not follow the prescribed development methodology or used the land in different ways. The first case in 2003, after LAUSA came in, involved Rongcheng Haida Shipbuilding Corporation which began the third phase of the project before receiving authorisation. It received a hefty fine and a pretty draconian measure, was ordered ‘to restore the sea to its original condition; (p. 124). This penalty is commonly used.

Measures to counter illegal reclamation were increasingly tightened. In January 2010 the SOA introduced the ‘Ten without exception’ rule, prohibiting any reclamation that caused serious damage to the environment, anything that did not enhance people’s livelihoods, any reclamation in specified areas including the Bohai Sea, and centralising approval of any projects with the central Government in Beijing.

So far, the author says (p. 135), land reclamation on China’s 14,500 km coastline has not adversely affected neighbouring states. It is still a domestic issue. This assertion is subject to an important caveat, to which the author alludes. The biggest and most controversial issue is directed by China’s state Government itself – the development and construction of military bases on reefs in the South China Sea. Could it be that having accreted all authority to direct land reclamation to itself, Beijing has allowed itself to determine what takes place everywhere, including reefs within the EEZs of neighbouring states? In the South China Sea, China has reclaimed – or created - 13 km² of land and built military facilities on them These include Mischief Reef, for example, which is well within the Philippines’ EEZ.

Part 2 of the book then focusses on Maritime Policing in a series of detailed and highly informative case studies.

Chapter 8, ‘An overview of INTERPOL’s involvement in tackling maritime piracy. history, developments, and legal issues’, is by Giulio Calcura and Mika Launiala, both of the University of Eastern Finland. Giulio Calcura specialises in international criminal and public international law and Dr Mika Launiala has worked for more than a decade as a Rural Police Chief in the Finnish police service. With 195 member countries, INTERPOL, founded in 1923) is the largest international organisation promoting direct and continuous cooperation between police services of different countries. This liaison is effected using National Central Bureaux (NCBs) As the UK does not have a national police force, liaison with INTERPOL is the responsibility of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) in Manchester, which is part of the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) (UNITED KINGDOM (interpol.int)). The USA is similar although it does have the FBI. The Interpol NCB is based in Washington DC (United States of America (interpol.int)). The FBI in fact has a network of Legal attaches (‘Legals’) similar to INTERPOL’s, covering 180 countries (International Operations — FBI). It works closely with INTERPOL. Contrary to common belief (including many movies), INTERPOL has no autonomous powers of investigation and cannot itself apprehend suspects or fugitives. Member countries are not legally obliged to act upon INTERPOL’s policies or
INTERPOL has many tools to knit police cooperation together including training, capacity building and provision of specialist support teams to local police forces. And, most importantly, perhaps, a secure international communications network with its NCBs. This INTERPOL network provides an alternative to conventional diplomatic channels (p. 142).

INTERPOL became aware of piracy, which had largely been in abeyance since the French conquest of North Africa from 1830, as a revived problem in the mid-1980s. At the time, interestingly, it came under the umbrella of ‘terrorism’. Nowadays it comes under the wider definition of maritime crime (p. 141).

On p. 143 the authors explain with great clarity how Article 3 of INTERPOL’s constitution has in some ways inhibited its dealing with piracy. The latest 1956 Constitution’s Article 3 says ‘it is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character’, thus enshrining the principle of neutrality (p. 143). Thus Article 3 effectively defines ‘ordinary crime’, of which piracy is not a part. This began to change with the 1957 High Seas Convention and Article 101 of UNCLOS in 1982 (p. 147).

Sections 2 and 3 of the Chapter (pp. 142-156) cover INTERPOL’s configuration, its modus operandi, and its specific involvement with maritime piracy. Since the mid-1980s, INTERPOL’s approach to maritime piracy has changed, for example, INTERPOL was heavily involved in Operation Atalanta, the US-led Operation Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and Nato’s Ocean Shield. In particular, in the context of EU Navfor Operation Atalanta, the EU Council directed in 2010, that Operation Atalanta should be directed through INTERPOL channels (p. 150). The authors conclude that INTERPOL continues to be ‘the organisation most suited for the delicate and necessary endeavour’, and for ‘connecting police forces and navies of different states in the fight against piracy’ (pp. 155-156).

Chapter 9, entitled ’The Incorporation of Private Security Actors to Protect Dutch Merchant Vessels: A Bourdieuian Reflection’ is by Koko Christianse of the University of Leiden and the book’s editor Yarin Eski. Pierre Bourdieu (1950–2002) was a French sociologist who saw the social world as comprising ‘distinct but overlapping fields’ (p. 161). In other words, the ‘assemblage’ approach also covered in the refereed article on migration earlier in this issue. The first part of the chapter examines the concept of security capital from a Bourdieuian perspective. Bourdieu said that there was no accumulation of physical [force] capital without simultaneous or prior accumulation of symbolic capital. A good example is that a police officer may exercise force because he or she wears a uniform or carries a badge or warrant card indicating that he or she represents the state, and not because he or she is the state. (p. 162).

Somali-based piracy hit the headlines in 2008. Before international naval forces were coordinated and deployed, Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) and the shipping industry began to cooperate in hiring and deploying Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)(p.164). Arming merchant ships was generally perceived as undesirable, reflecting the idea that states should have a monopoly of violence enunciated by German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). But needs must. States were slower to follow and the Dutch ‘Wet ter Beschirming van de Koopvaardij’– the Merchant Vessel Protection Act’ (MVPA) was proposed to the Dutch Senate in September 2016. It proposed the legalisation of PCASP to protect merchant vessels in areas with a high risk of pirate attacks. Before that the Netherlands limited armed protection of their merchant ships to Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) comprising Dutch Marines. The reasons for considering PCASP were partly practical. The VPDs had to consist of at least 11 Marines and many Dutch ships just did not have accommodation for that number. PCASP were allowed on board with a minimum of three. And also, the time required to approve a VPD was far too long, especially for ships involved in the spot market. To embark Dutch Marines a ship might also have to make a substantial detour, adding further time and cost. Finally, a VPD was far more expensive than a team from
an internationally active PCASP. The Dutch therefore came up with the ‘VPD-unless’ system where the ship must qualify for the deployment of a VPD but had to demonstrate that a VPD could not be deployed in time and that it would be far more expensive than a PCASP.

Chapter 10, ‘Security Community Building in the Mediterranean Sea: The European Union’s strategy in Combating Irregular Migration’ is by Shazwanis Shukri. Of Universiti Utara, Malaysia. The same issue is analysed in one of the refereed articles in this Journal, above. The EU began counter-migration strategy with the creation of the body responsible for coordinating cooperation, Frontex, in 2005. The author analyses the various EU operations. The first was Hera, from July to October 2006, to assist Spanish authorities to police the areas off the Canary Islands, Mauritania Senegal, and Cape Verde. The second was Nautilus from October 2006 to October 2007 to help Italy and Malta tackle the migrant flow from Libya and Tunisia. Then came Joint Operation Triton from November 2014, again a Frontex operation to help Italy and Malta. In addition to helping secure Italian territorial waters, the operation extended to Search and Rescue (SAR) in Malta’s SAR zone and also detected smuggling, drug trafficking and IUU fishing. Then came operation Euronavfor-Med Operation Sophia (henceforward Operation Sophia). In April 2015 the deadliest shipwreck incident so far resulted in nearly 800 deaths. Sophia was the name given to a baby who was rescued. The operation to disrupt human trafficking in the south-central Mediterranean began on 22 June. It is covered in detail in the refereed article in this Journal, above. Like that article, this chapter in the book stresses the need for security community building and cooperation. The author concludes (p. 192) that there is no quick fix to this problem and that Europe’s migration crisis to continue for the foreseeable future. The EU should continuously control, regulate and work closely with other regional actors.

Chapters 11 to 15 focus on port security. Chapter 11 ‘Security networks in ports: What’s in a name?’ is by Eva Dinchel, a criminologist working for the City of Freiburg and Marleen Easton, a sociologist at Ghent University. The chapter begins by saying that ‘Ports are the “beating” heart of flows of people, goods, information and money. Ports are places that are required to keep an uninterrupted flow running while securing citizens against any threats deriving from these flows, especially as ports are deeply interconnected with their cities, not only by geographical proximity’ (p. 195). The authors thus reiterate that ports are the ‘glue’ with a port-sea interface and a port-city interface, expressed in earlier chapters of the book.

The chapter then focusses on a case study of the port of Antwerp. It features two excellent tables and a clear and useful diagram (Figure 11.1) which this reviewer believes could well be used as a model for mapping security networks in other ports. However, the chapter also ranges more widely and (pp. 208-209) covers the ‘potentiality to transcend borders. The authors cite the fascinating example of a trip to south America by the Mayors of Antwerp and Rotterdam to search for partners to combat cocaine trafficking. In February 2022, they said.

‘We are looking for a group of people we can trust to improve cooperation… At this minute Colombia is the only country in the region with which you can co-operate, where there is a strong state apparatus and the ambition to counter the drug exists.’ (p. 209).

In Chapter 12, the book moves from Antwerp to Rotterdam, with ‘Public-private cooperation in the approach to drug crime in the port of Rotterdam - the case of the Information-sharing Center Port Safety and Security’. It is by Lieselot Bisschop, Professor of Public-Private Interests at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Richard Staring and Robby Roks, from the same, and Gwynneth Goudsblom, a consultant on Public-Private Partnerships between Dutch seaports. A public-private partnership (PPP, 3P, or P3) is a long-term arrangement between a government and private sector institutions of The term came into widespread use in the 1990s. Clearly, in the maritime security sector, where states, with their territorial control, city and port authorities, customs, police, judiciary, and private companies (including PMCs) all need to coexist, the PPP concept is exceptionally relevant. The chapter focusses on a case study of the Information Sharing Center (ISC) Port Safety and Security. Figure 12.1 on p. 220 is an exceptionally clear and useful map of the public and private actors at the port of Rotterdam. The ISC started in 2014 and had defined terms of reference. Because many of the private companies involved were actually competitors there was a danger that, if they agreed on something, they might be perceived as
a ‘cartel’, able to bring combined pressure on the public sector (p. 222). That is an important point. The authors unsurprisingly conclude that PPP are particularly relevant to port security. In particular, because they share expertise about organised crime (p. 230).

Chapter 13 moves a little further to Amsterdam and the North Sea Canal Area (NSCA). It is called ‘Governing “undermining” versus policing drug-related organized crime in the Port of Amsterdam and North Sea Canal Area. An empirical study of port policing an ambiguous concept’. It is by book editor Yarin Eski, Maura Boelens, a consultant specialising in regional information and expertise at the eponymous centre (RIEC) in the Netherlands, and Danique de Rijk, who has a research degree in Societal Resilience from Vrije University Amsterdam, and works with several Governmental organisations tackling organized crime. The NSCA is most important because it contains the world’s largest sea loch and thus offers an ideal opportunity for large sea-going vessels to traffic drugs, specifically cocaine. In June 2020, on a visit to the port of Ijmunden, former Justice and Security Minister Ferdinand Grapperhaus noted that organized undermining crime likes to take advantage of our legal economy and good infrastructure’ (p. 235). Organized crime is increasingly referred to as undermining when legal markets, industries and structures are abused the benefit of illegal (financial) gain (p. 228). The term thus relates to collateral damage from drug smuggling such as traffic offences, threats and money laundering. It is therefore an ‘ambiguous concept’ and difficult to police. The chapter concludes that policing undermining drug crime is rather like a rabbit looking into the headlights of a car. The blinding light of wider undermining paralyzes operational port policing (p. 248).

Chapter 14. ‘Securing Norwegian maritime ports: Navigation in a complex regulatory regime’ is by Dr Martin Nekleberg, a criminologist at the Norwegian Research Institute. The study focusses on the ports of Stavanger and Kristiansand. These ports are foci not only for merchant shipping and the North Sea oil industry but also for cruise ships. Before 9/11, the main regulation was the Saving of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention, amended in 1974. This was perceived as applying mainly to ships at sea. The 9/11 attacks and maritime terrorist attacks such as that on the USS Cole in 2000, led to the 2004 International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Until the inception of ISPS on 1 July 2004 policing at Norwegian ports was relatively relaxed and the ports were integral parts of the local community, with public access to the waterfront for purposes like fishing. Initial responses were highly negative, confirmed by many primary sources. Isolating the ports behind fences and airport-style security led to them being referred to as ‘terror fences’ (p. 267). In time the local communities and port actors got used to it, recognising that compliance with ISPS was necessary to continue operating.

Chapter 15 is” Kid, This Ain’t Your Night” Organized Crime and Discrimination at the Port of New York and New Jersey’. It is by Paul E Babchik and Jeffrey Walden, both Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, an unusual bi-State organisation responsible for the ports of New Yorke and New Jersey. The title, probably the most imaginative in the book, is a quotation from the classic 1954 award-winning movie On the Waterfront starring Marlon Brando. Like many classic films it is based on a true story. Brando’s character, Malloy, was once a promising boxer but throws a fight because his brother is threatened by the mobsters who control hiring of waterfront workers. So it was not to be his night.

The film is a fictionalised account of the events that resulted in the creation of Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor in 1953. In the 1940s and early 1950s there were about 40,000 longshoremen – port workers, but there was seldom enough work for more than 15,000 per day. The hiring foreman might well be a convicted criminal. In order to get hired longshoremen might need to pay a ten percent kickback to the hiring foreman, buy him whiskey, bribe union officials, purposely lose card games and sporting events covered by a bookie linked to the union or the hiring foreman, and so on. Racism also played a major part.
The Waterfront Commission was created in 1953 after a series of articles in the New York Times by Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Malcolm Johnson from 1948. Following the articles, longshoremen carried out a strike against their own union leaders, the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) in 1951 (p. 277). Finally, in 1953, a report by the New York State Crime Commission led to hearings attended by the New York Crime Commissioner Thomas Dewey and also by representatives from New Jersey. The representatives from two States entered into a compact approved by the US Congress in August 1953, to create the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. On 1 December 1953 only individuals registered with the Waterfront Commission could work as longshoremen, thus curbing the powers of the ILA.

The Commission faced numerous challenges over the next 70 years. One was containerisation in the 1980s which further reduced the number of jobs available. The crime families that dominated the ILA – the mafia – remained a problem. The chapter details the efforts to counter organized crime from the 1970s, as a 1980s a prosecutor noted before the Senate that the Waterfront Commission had not ‘solved every problem, but things would be much worse without it’ (p. 283). New challenges remain. In 2018 the State of New Jersey threatened to withdraw from the Commission, following disputes over the Commission’s role in enforcing employers’ obligations to enforce diversity (p. 284).

The book’s Conclusion, by the Editors (pp. 289-292) summarises the wide range of maritime topics covered and the interdisciplinary perspectives on them, the topics range from piracy, drug smuggling, human trafficking to networked maritime and port policing. The disciplines involved include criminology, policing studies, critical security studies, military studies, resilience, law, political science, international relations, public administration, and ethnography. Regarding maritime or ‘blue’ crime, the editors make four recommendations. First, there is a limited appreciation of the causes of piracy and how piracy and other illegal maritime businesses remain land-based problems. Piracy needs to be seen as part of a broader maritime crime complex. Second, a broader focus on land-based (criminal) causes regarding piracy leads to a focus on other, often interlinked crime such as migration flows and IUU fishing. Third, a more holistic approach to the littoral as a maritime domain is needed. This should also include illegal land reclamation in developing coastal countries, an ‘understudied phenomenon’. Fourth, a more comprehensive focus on tackling port crime is needed. Ports are still considered, problematically, just part of the maritime domain. In fact, managing the port sea interface and the port-city/hinterland interface should be seen as one – the ‘glue’ analogy.

Like any good work of research, the book ends with ‘recommendations for further research’. There are five. First are historical-philosophical maritime and policing studies. Second, critical studies of white-collar maritime crime and corruption. Third, the study of maritime technology, cyber-crime and policing. Fourth, the hybridisation of naval (underwater) warfare, maritime organised crime and maritime policing. And fifth, maritime geographical crimes and harms, these include environmental damage, including pollution and illegal land reclamation.

The editors conclude with a lovely quotation from Jacques Cousteau:
‘The sea, once it casts its spell, holds one in its net of wonder forever’ (p. 293).

This book is outstanding. As this very detailed review shows, the editors and publisher have garnered an outstanding team of experts from across the world. They should all be congratulated on creating the first and only definitive and comprehensive work on Maritime Crime and Policing ever. The complex, interconnected issues are knitted together throughout the chapters – no doubt in part because of superb editorial direction. This book, although it is expensive, is essential for anyone involved in maritime crime and/or security. It is unlikely to be surpassed and will probably rate a second updated edition. Bravo Zulu!

Chris Bellamy 19 May 2023